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California Supreme Court Creates a New Exception to
the Search Warrant Requirement: People v. Sirhan
On the morning of June 5, 1968, Sirhan Sirhan's brothers, Adel and Munir,
went to the police station after seeing a newspaper picture of Sirhan in con-
nection with the shooting of Senator Robert Kennedy. Adel was interviewed
by an officer who knew that the Senator had been shot earlier that same morn-
ing. The officer also knew that a suspect was in custody, and apparently knew
that the suspect's identity had not been revealed. Adel advised the officer of
Sirhan's identity and stated that the brothers lived with their mother. The
officer asked if a search of the home could be made. Adel acknowledged that
it was his mother's house, but, as far as he was concerned, they could.' Fearing
a possible conspiracy, the officer and two others then went with Adel to the
Sirhan residence without a warrant. The ensuing search of Sirhan's bedroom
produced incriminating evidence.! At Sirhan's trial, the defense objected to
introduction of this evidence on the ground that there was no probable cause
to support the search and, therefore, the search was unlawful. The objection
was overruled and Sirhan was convicted. An automatic appeal to the Supreme
Court of California followed. Held, affirmed: Although police officers do not
have reasonable cause to believe that a house contains evidence of a con-
spiracy to assassinate prominent political leaders, the mere possibility that
there might be such evidence fully justifies a warrantless search of the house.
People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution contains two
clauses.' The first clause affords protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The second clause, enumerating the conditions precedent to the is-
suance of a warrant, clearly governs the validity of a search made pursuant to
a warrant. The evidence produced by an invalid search is inadmissible at
trial.! However, it is not clear from the language of the amendment alone
'The trial court upheld the search on a finding of consent. On appeal the California
Supreme Court did not reach the question of consent in upholding the search.
'The officers found an envelope bearing the notation "RFK must be disposed of like
his brother was." A notebook was found containing "a prediction of America's downfall,
an attack upon its leaders, and comments relating to 'doing away' with those leaders." A
second notebook was discovered which contained notations such as "RFK must be assassi-
nated" and "Ambassador Goldberg must die." People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 736, 497
P.2d 1121, 1138, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 402 (1972).
'The lengthy opinion involves many alleged grounds for reversal. This discussion is
confined solely to the fourth amendment question raised by the warrantless search of Sirhan
Sirhan's bedroom.
4 U.S. CONS'r. amend. IV requires that: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."
4 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). All fourth amendment standards, including the
"exclusionary rule," which requires that evidence produced in an invalid search be excluded
from trial, are applied to the states. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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whether a warrant is required for a valid search. There has been support for
the position that the two clauses should be read separately and that searches
should be governed solely by a standard of reasonableness, whether or not
based upon a warrant.' The Supreme Court has not followed this view,7 but
has instead interpreted the fourth amendment as requiring that a search war-
rant be obtained whenever practical.8 Repeatedly, the Court has held that the
two clauses are complementary and must be read together.! The result has
been that searches conducted without prior authorization by warrant are
presumptively unreasonable. 0
The basic aim of the warrant requirement is to protect persons against
indiscriminate police actions. This is accomplished by placing a "neutral and
detached magistrate"" between the police and the people. The magistrate has
the responsibility of objectively determining the existence of probable cause
to search. He must base his decision on specific facts; suspicion is not equivalent
to probable cause and will not satisfy the mandate of the Constitution. The
probable cause standard demands substantial evidence that the items sought
are connected with criminal activity and that the items will be found in the
place searched."
If. THE EXCEPTIONS: EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Although there has long been a preference for search warrants, the Court
has recognized that the requirement must not be inflexible. As a practical
matter, crime prevention would be thwarted if police were obligated to obtain
a warrant before searching in every instance. Thus, certain specific exceptions
have eroded the requirement where exigent circumstances make it impractical
to procure prior authorization for the search. Early Supreme Court dicta indi-
cated that a warrant was unnecessary for the search of a person at the time
of his lawful arrest. " This exception has been allowed for the reason that,
'United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947). In Rabinowitz the Court stated that "[t)he relevant test is not whether it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." 339 U.S.
at 66.
7 The Harris and Rabinowitz decisions came under a great deal of criticism, and were
overruled in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
1Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), held that where police make a "stop" it would
not be practical to require a warrant for a "frisk" of the suspect.
'See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948). In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925), a case involv-
ing the warrantless search of a house, the Court stated that "[blelief, however well founded,
that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search
of that place without a warrant."
l°"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967).
11Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
"Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
"sSee Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961).
"' "It is not an assertion of the right on the part of the Government, always recognized
under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested
(Vol. 27
NOTES
given probable cause for the arrest, there is also cause to search the arrestee
for destructible evidence and for dangerous weapons which might be used
against police. The exception has since become deeply embedded in criminal
procedural law."
Closely related to a search incident to arrest is a search carried on while in
"hot pursuit" of a suspect. In Warden v. Hayden'6 police, without a warrant,
followed a suspect into his home only five minutes after he had entered it.
They began a search which produced evidence used in the suspect's conviction.
The Supreme Court upheld the search, again reasoning that an exigent cir-
cumstance was presented in which a police officer's life might be endangered
or evidence of the crime destroyed.
Given a valid initial intrusion, the "plain view" exception" allows police to
seize evidence which is open to view and which is discovered inadvertently.18
The Court has reasoned that once police have lawfully intruded into a private
area, it is no greater intrusion to allow them to seize evidence found in plain
view. 9 This exception is also based upon probable cause. Before it can be ap-
plied, the initial intrusion must have been founded upon a warrant (which
must be supported by probable cause), or upon a warrant exception such as
lawful arrest or hot pursuit (in which cases there is also probable cause to
search2 ).
The Supreme Court has sanctioned exceptions to the warrant requirement
generally whenever there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime
is about to be destroyed or made inaccessible to police.2 Connected with these
exceptions are automobile searches, which have given rise to yet another set
of exigent circumstances." Since the vehicle could be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought, the time
necessary to procure a warrant would obviously make that course impractical.
Thus, given probable cause," police may make a warrantless search of auto-
to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914).
15See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
The scope of the search incident to a lawful arrest has been extended from the arrestee's
person to the surrounding area from which he might seize destructible evidence or weapons.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
111387 U.S. 294 (1967).
"A complete explanation of the "plain view" doctrine may be found in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-72 (1971).
"8 Inadvertence is required to prevent the "plain view" exception from authorizing a
general exploratory search. To allow police to seize evidence which they know in advance
will be found in plain view "would fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of
probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure." Id. at 471.
Ild. at 467.
'°Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
"See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (warrantless search held invalid
where there was no reason to believe that narcotics were about to be destroyed by the peti-
tioner's relatives); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (warrantless taking of
blood sample from petitioner accused of driving while intoxicated held valid due to rapid
dissipation of alcoholic content).
'See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
""But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a
right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent
official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
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mobiles in most instances."4
The above exceptions have a very important common characteristic in that
each requires probable cause.25 An exception to the warrant requirement ap-
plies only to the need for prior judicial authorization and not to the necessary
element of probable cause to search. This important distinction was enunciated
in Chambers v. Maroney:
In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a mini-
mum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution. As a
general rule, it has also required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable
cause issue and the issuance of a warrant before a search is made. Only in
exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause
serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.'
More simply stated, a legal search may be authorized in one of two ways:
(1) with a search warrant that has been based upon probable cause; or (2)
under exigent circumstances coupled with probable cause. 7 There is even con-
siderable authority for the proposition that, to encourage use of the warrant,
the standard for probable cause justifying warrantless searches should be more
stringent than the standard justifying the judicial issuance of the warrant."s
I1. PEOPLE V. SIRHAN
At the trial, one of the officers who searched Sirhan's bedroom testified that
there was nothing which "indicated [defendant) was engaged in any con-
spiracy" and that the officers had no prior knowledge of any evidence of con-
spiracy."' It is doubtful whether under the facts of this case any court could
have found sufficient probable cause to support a search warrant. However,
this court considered the existence of probable cause to be irrelevent. The
court stated simply that the "officers did not have reasonable cause to believe
that the house contained evidence of a conspiracy."'" Although the standard of
probable cause was not met, the search was upheld.
The court cited several United States Supreme Court cases involving the
'However, the opportunity for search must be truly fleeting. In Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the police had known of the involvement of the car for over
two weeks before the search and had had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant.
There were, therefore, no exigent circumstances and the search was invalid.
'5See notes 20, 23 supra, and accompanying text. Consent to search is also an exception
to the warrant requirement. It is deemed a waiver of the need to show probable cause.
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). See also Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624(1946).
26399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
27However, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) the Court did allow a very limited
warrantless search of a suspect's outer garments where there was no showing of the usual
standard of probable cause. The Court reasoned that the intrusion was so slight and the
danger to police so great that only a lesser showing of probable cause is needed. The "frisk"
was allowed where the officer "stopped" the suspect upon observing suspicious activity. The
opinion made it clear that any further search or detention of the suspect would have re-
quired the higher standard of probable cause. This lesser standard of probable cause has not
been extended beyond the "stop and frisk" situation.28 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d
871 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
297 Cal. 3d at 735, 497 P.2d at 1138, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
11Id. at 739, 497 P.2d at 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
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search of dwellings as providing authority for its decision.8 However, none of
the cases cited lend support to the proposition that a search may be justified
upon an exigent circumstance without a sufficient showing of probable cause.
In all but two of the cited cases, the Supreme Court found that there were no
exigent circumstances and held the searches invalid without deciding whether
probable cause existed. Although these cases illustrate that an exigent circum-
stance may supersede the necessity of securing a search warrant, they do not
hold that probable cause is unnecessary. In the remaining two cases, Chimel
v. California"' and Warden v. Hayden, there were exigent circumstances, but
there was also probable cause to search. The former involved a search incident
to a lawful arrest, and the latter involved hot pursuit. In Warden v. Hayden
the Supreme Court, after holding that the lack of a search warrant was excused
by the exigent circumstance, stated that "the intrusions are nevertheless made
after fulfilling the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment."84 This language further emphasizes the requirement, apparently
overlooked by the California court, that even in a situation involving exigent
circumstances, the standard of probable cause must be met.
The California court stated that it was reasonable to believe that there
might have been a conspiracy, that the crime was of enormous gravity and
involved more than possibly idle threats, and that, therefore, the "mere pos-
sibility" of evidence of a conspiracy fully warranted the officers' actions.'
Conceding that these factors did combine to create an exigent situation where
fast action would be necessary, only one-half of the requirement for a valid
search was met. By the court's own admission, probable cause did not exist.
In effect, the court held that the "mere possibility" of evidence helped to
create the exigent circumstance and the same "mere possibility" gave sufficient
cause to justify the search. The California Supreme Court has not only recog-
nized a new set of exigent circumstances creating an exception to the warrant
requirement, but has also introduced into the exception a new standard of
cause to justify the search. "Mere possibility" has been substituted by the
California court for probability.8
81The cases cited are: Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1969); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
In its opinion the court also cited for authority two California cases involving the search
of dwellings, People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956) and People v. Su-
perior Court (Peebles), 6 Cal. App. 3d 379, 85 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1970). However, neither
of these cases held that probable cause was not present or that it was unnecessary for the
warrantless search. In People v. Roberts police entered an apartment upon hearing sounds
of distress and found incriminating evidence in plain view. In People v. Superior Court
the police had information that materials for making bombs were in the apartment; hot
pursuit was also involved. In a third case cited by the court, People v. Gomez, 229 Cal.
App. 2d 781, 40 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1964), officers searched the pockets of an unconscious
man having convulsions to discover what was wrong with him. Here again it was not held
that probable cause was unnecessary. However, it could be argued that in light of Terry
v. Ohio the normal standard of probable cause was not necessary due to the limited intru-
sion. See note 27 supra.
8 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
-11387 U.S. 294 (1967).
34 1d.
87 Cal. 3d at 739, 497 P.2d at 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
" In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949), the Supreme Court stated
19731
